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justice Alan B. Handler: A Towering Justice
The Hon. Daniel. O'Hern *
Every great court needs a cleanup hitter, someone strong,
someone certain, someone upon whom others can safely rely to come
through at crucial moments. That was Justice Handler's role on the
New Jersey Supreme Court. Of all the Justices, he had the deepest
mind and the greatest reservoir of judicial experience and
understanding.
At his retirement, he had served longer on the New Jersey
Supreme Court than any otherJustice but two,Justices Nathan Jacobs
and Robert L. Clifford.
In many ways, Justice Handler's career paralleled that of Justice
Jacobs. Each was a native of the Newark area. Each was a graduate of
the Harvard Law School.
Like that of Justice Jacobs, Justice
Handler's career bridged the two great transformative eras of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, established under the New Jersey
Constitution of 1947. The Court's first work was to reform and
modernize the common law to make it more consistent with the
needs of post-World War II society and more consistent with our
understanding of the importance of the individual in that new
society. For example, insurance law was reformed to provide that
individuals who read an insurance policy would not be deprived of
their fair understanding of the policy.! Consumers who purchased
defective products would be able to gain recourse from the
manufacturers of the products. Debtors who were led into unfair
bargaining relationships were permitted to be relieved from the
holder-in-due-course rule.
Toward the end of that period of transformation, the Court
turned its attention to consideration of human rights, most notably in
the context of equal access to housing and educational opportunity.

Associate Justice, NewJersey Supreme Court.
2

SeeAllen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965).
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In Robinson v. Cahill,4 the Court held that equal funding must be
provided for children in disadvantaged communities. In Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,5 the Court held that NewJersey's
zoning power must be exercised in the public interest to afford a fair
opportunity for persons of low and moderate income to live in every
community in the state.
Through these years, Justice Handler was an active member of
the New Jersey legal community. Admitted to the bar in 1956, he
joined the office of the New Jersey Attorney General in 1961 and
participated in many of these major changes in society. In 1967, he
was appointed to the superior court and elevated to the appellate
division in 1973. In 1976, he left the appellate division to serve as
Chief Counsel to Governor Brendan T. Byrne. In that capacity, he
was deeply involved in the reform of government funding. In 1977,
Governor Byrne appointed him to the New Jersey Supreme Court,
during the final years ofJustice Jacob's tenure.
In Justice Handler's 1989 law review article, Individual Worth,6 he
wrote:
A surprising number of intense human dramas have recently
played on the judicial stage. In the guise of court decisions, they
have presented very poignant themes, involving the most sensitive
kinds of personal concerns-procreation, birth, health, survival,
and dying. What seems unusual about all of this is not the drama
of these episodes but that they have been produced and directed
by courts.
For over twenty years, Justice Handler was at center stage as these
intense human dramas were played out.
Within those years, the NewJersey Supreme Court was called on
to appraise the value of human life in wrongful birth and wrongful
life claims. Justice Handler cast his imprint on the Court's decisions.
His dissent in Hummel v. Reisd traced the long evolution of that
doctrine and his role in shaping it. Justice Handler explained how in
Berman v. Allan,9 the Court had come to recognize a cause of action
for wrongful birth that had not been recognized in Gleitman v.
Cosgrove.0 He harkened to Justice Jacob's dissent in the Gleitman
4
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See Alan B. Handler, Individual Worth, 17 HOFSTRAL. REv. 493 (1989).
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10 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); see also Hume4 129 N.J. at 137-38, 608 A.2d at
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opinion, explaining "that malpractice committed against a pregnant
woman caused harm not only to the woman but also to her family.""
Justice Handler referenced his own dissent in Berman, in which he
elaborated on the character of the tort: "' [T]he duty [the physicians]
owed Mrs. Berman enveloped a duty to the unborn child. The
breach of that duty affects both."".2 Justice Handler also invoked the
words of Justice Pollock, who wrote: "'A family is woven of the fibers
of life; if one strand is damaged, the whole structure may suffer. The
filaments of family life, although 3individually spun, create a web of
interconnected [legal] interests."",
Finally, Justice Handler recalled that in Procanik v. Cill,

4

the

Court extended the web of protection to cover claims brought
"'When a child requires
directly by handicapped children:
extraordinary medical care, the financial impact is felt not just by the
parents, but also by the injured child."".5 Justice Handler explained
that, although the ProcanikCourt refused to grant "impaired children
the full measure of their damages, that decision nonetheless brought
[the Court] full circle back to Justice Jacobs's original dissent in
Gleitman."'6 In Gleitman, Justice Jacobs had written that "'while logical
objection may be advanced to the child's standing and injury, logic is
not the determinative factor and should not be permitted to obscure
that he has to bear the frightful weight of his [handicap] throughout
life."17
Justice Handler's allusion to law as drama mirrors Justice
Pollock's allusion to law as art."' Each of these Justices saw the
relationship between law and the larger themes that govern our lives.
The theme of individual worth permeates Justice Handler's view
of the judicial universe. In his memorable dissent in State v.
Marshall,'9 Justice Handler noted the "emergence of the disquieting
truth that capital punishment cannot really be made to work in a
1 Humme4 129 N.J. at 137, 608 A.2d at 1351 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing
Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 50, 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs,J., dissenting)).
2 Id. (partial alteration in original) (quoting Berman, 80 N.J. at 444, 404 A.2d at
20 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

15 Id. at 137-38, 608 A.2d at 1351 (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting Schroeder v.
Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 63-64, 432 A.2d 834, 839 (1981)).
:4 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).

5 Humme4 129 N.J. at 138, 608 A.2d at 1351 (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting
Procanik,97 N.J. at 351, 478 A.2d at 762).
16

Id., 608 A.2d at 1352 (HandlerJ., dissenting).

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting G/eitman, 49 N.J. at 50, 227 A.2d at 704
(Jacobs, J., dissenting)).
is See Stewart G. Pollock, The Art ofJudging,71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591 (1996).
19 123 NJ. 1,586A.2d85 (1991).
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civilized society."20 He recalled the words of the poetJohn Donne to
remind us that we are all members of the same human family:
"'[A]ny man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in
mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it
tolls for thee.', 2 1 In State v. Timmendequas,n Justice Handler's final
appeal to the Court's conscience, the Justice recalled La
Rochefoucauld's maxim that "death, like the sun, cannot be looked
at steadily."2 3 Justice Handler wrote:
The Court, in its attempt to look directly at death, loses its vision.
...The sacrifice we make when we sentence a defendant to life
imprisonment instead of death pales in comparison to what we
gain by holding that a defendant who cannot receive a fair trial in
this State simply cannot be put to death, no matter how certain
and clear his guilt. By abandoning principle and yielding judicial
integrity in order to put the defendant to death, we lose, with
even greater finality, the essence of fairness that is the heart of
our criminal justice system.24
Justice Handler's creed was that the authority of the courts
depends entirely on the public's acceptance of their opinions
because judges lack temporal authority to enforce their opinions
through the use of force. To gain acceptance, the courts' opinions
must be "intrinsically persuasive."2 He explained that
[a] valid judicial decision is one that holds no secrets or hidden
meanings, that inspires confidence that it is right as well as
correct, sound as well as accurate, complete as well as pointed,
fair as well as wise, and tolerant as well as decisive. It should
reflect a sense ofjustice that is, in a word, prudential.2
Such decisions would enhance the Supreme Court's legitimacy.
Consequently, the Court called upon him to explain in Abbott v.
Burke IiV and Abbott v. Burke V,28 among the most momentous of the
Court's decisions, that the Court would insist on the fulfillment of its
Id. at 266, 586 A.2d at 225 (Handler,J., dissenting).
Id. at 267, 586 A.2d at 226 (Handler, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting John Donne, Meditation XVII (1624), reprinted inTHE OxFoRD ANTHOLOGY
20
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or ENGLISH LrrERATuRE 1057 (Frank Kermode &John Hollander eds., Oxford Univ.

Press 1973)).

161 N.J. 515, 737 A.2d 55 (1999).
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Id. at 722, 737 A.2d at 172 (HandlerJ, dissenting).
Id. at 722-23, 737 A.2d at 172 (Handler, J, dissenting).
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See Alan B. Handler, Jurispmdence and PrudentialJustice,16 SETON HALL L.REV.
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571, 596 (1986).
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Id.

149 N.J. 145, 693 A.2d 417 (1997).
153 N.J. 480, 710 A.2d 450 (1998).
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mandate that equal educational opportunity be afforded to the
underprivileged children of inner-city schools. Although Justice
Handler's writing style lacked the fervor of our late Chief Justice
Wilentz, it contained the same measure of commitment. Justice
Handler wrote in Abbott IV
The remedial proceedings to be conducted on remand are a step
in the remedial process that should lead ultimately to the full
realization of the constitutional educational opportunity.
Although it remains our hope that needed comprehensive relief
eventually will come from those branches of government more
suited to the task, there can be no responsible dissent from the
position that the Court has the constitutional obligation to do
what it can to effectuate and vindicate the constitutional rights of
the school children in the poverty-stricken urban districts.29
Returning to the metaphor of law as art, Justice Handler may be
viewed as an architect framing the structure of government. He was
not a man of absolutes. He tended to view constitutional doctrine as
having "play in the joints." In Marsa v. Wernik,3° authored by Justice
Handler, the Court held that having a council member commence a
public meeting by calling for a silent meditation or delivering an
invocation, the subject of which was determined by the council
member, did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. In Knight v. City of Margate,3 ' the Justice found a
"twilight zone" in the doctrine of separation of powers to enable the
Court to sustain a delicate balance between the executive and
legislative branches. Justice Handler wrote: "The constitutional
doctrine of the separation of powers denotes not only independence
but also interdependence among the branches of government.
Indeed, the division of governmental powers implants a symbiotic
relationship between the separate governmental parts so that the
governmental organism will not only survive but will flourish."32 In
3 Justice Handler found that a private property
State v. Schmid,"
right
had to yield to a broader need for free speech on a university
campus. Conversely, in New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New
Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission,34 the Justice wrote to sustain
the constitutionality of New Jersey's election-funding laws despite
some restraint on speech. In Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of
Abbott V,149 N.J. at 202, 693 A.2d at 445.
86 N.J. 232, 430 A.2d 888 (1981).
31 86 N.J. 374, 431 A.2d 833 (1981).
" Id. at 388, 431 A.2d at 840.
33 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d
615 (1980).
% 82 N.J. 57, 411 A.2d 168 (1980).
29
30

706

SETONHALL LAWREVEW

[Vol. 30:701

Holmdel," Justice Handler parsed the relationship between home rule
and exclusionary zoning and a state mandate for inclusionary zoning.
He was also every bit the common-law judge. Writing opinions
for the Court in a vast array of contexts, he argued for the
presumption that consumers of products would heed a warning, if
given,6 the duty of a manufacturer to foresee alterations in its
product,3 7 and the duty of a commercial owner of property to provide
a safe place of access for customers.' In all of these common-law
cases, he displayed the skill of the late United States Supreme Court
Justice Cardozo in weaving varied strands of doctrine to make the
fabric of the law.
Although Justice Handler will not recall this, when he circulated
his opinion in People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.," I
wrote him a note expressing the view that the opinion would be as
well remembered as Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co. In People
Express,Justice Handler discarded the physical harm requirement for
negligently inflicted economic losses and sustained a cause of action
for foreseeable economic damages occasioned by a negligent act.
Justice Handler explained that many courts had based their refusal to
allow recovery for purely economic losses on the physical harm
requirement, "fearing that if even one deserving plaintiff suffering
purely economic loss were allowed to recover, all such plaintiffs could
recover."4' The Justice, however, believed that the Court could
fashion a rule that limited liability yet permitted adjudication of
meritorious claims.42 While tracing the various exceptions to the
physical harm requirement, he discovered a common theme"[w] hen the plaintiffs are reasonably foreseeable, the injury is directly
and proximately caused by defendant's negligence, and liability can
be limited fairly."4 Thus,Justice Handler concluded that
a defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures to
avoid the risk of causing economic damages, aside from physical
injury, to particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an
identifiable class with respect to whom defendant knows or has
reason to know are likely to suffer such damages from its
35
36
37

121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990).
See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 628 A.2d 710 (1993).
See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984).

See Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993).
100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985).
40 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
41 PeopLe Expes, 100 N.J. at 254, 495 A.2d
at 111.
3s
39

4

See id.
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conduct."4
Finally, he was a righteous judge. In matters of attorney ethics,
he demanded the highest qualities of character. In In re Rigolosi,4
Justice Handler wrote to disbar an attorney despite ajury verdict that
had exonerated the attorney of witness tampering.
More was
required, the Justice found, than that an attorney escape criminal
conviction. Justice Handler wrote:
Respondent's conduct reveals a flaw running so deep that he can
never again be permitted to practice law. This is not a case of a
novice who had not yet had opportunity to develop a sense of
ethics. Respondent was an attorney steeped in the ways of law,
government, and politics. No amount of good works can save
someone who, with all the knowledge and experience that he
accumulated, "poisons the well ofjustice."46
In In re McLaughlin,7 Justice Handler discussed the need for
both attorneys and bar applicants to adhere to the highest principles
of integrity. TheJustice wrote:
Candidates for the bar are expected to understand and satisfy the
personal, educational and professional requisites that inhere in
good character and fitness and are indispensable in one seeking
authorization to engage in the practice of law. Good character
does not emerge on licensure. It is absurd to suggest that good
character is not revealed until a person becomes an attorney. The
fundamental character traits of honesty and truthfulness are not
valued in the abstract, but are assumed to be inherent aspects of
one's personality; they can, and must, be considered the measure
of a candidate's eligibility to seek admission to practice law and
ability to fulfill the responsibilities of the legal profession. 4
Although he managed, in a long series of Court portraits, always
to be photographed with the same frown, Justice Handler had the
lightest of hearts. His humor enlivened many conferences and the
hours between oral argument. He was the Justice best able to tweak
the imperialism of our late Chief Justice Wilentz. Chief Justice
Wilentz was the master of long single-spaced letters as a means of
conveying his views on matters of Court business. These letters were
weighty in substantive content, quality, and quantity. Of one such
letter, Justice Handler said to the ChiefJustice at a conference: "Like
any piece of good literature, upon a re-reading, you can always find
Id. at 263, 495 A.2d at 116.
107 N.J. 192, 526 A.2d 670 (1987).
Id. at 210, 526 A.2d at 681.
47

144 N.J. 133, 675A.2d 1101 (1996).
Id. at 148, 675 A.2d at 1109.
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new riches in your memos."
At oral argument, his deep voice and slightly forbidding
appearance made it impossible for lawyers to realize that he was often
on their side. He would, in the course of oral argument, throw out
rhetorical lifelines to lawyers who were adrift. Invariably the lawyers
would reject the lifelines, suspecting some ulterior motive on Justice
Handler's part rather than a genuine desire to assist the lawyer in
explaining the lawyer's point.
I will miss him greatly. Justice Handler was my oldest friend on
the Court. We had known each other at the bar for almost forty
years. I served with him on the Court every day for eighteen years.
His wit brightened every conference of the Court, and he was a
source of strength for all of us, a repository of accumulated wisdom
with an innate ethical sense and a passion for justice best exemplified
by his dissents in capital cases.
Life will go on, the NewJersey Supreme Court will go on, but the
New Jersey Supreme Court will never be the same as when Justice
Handler graced our bench.

